Abstract. We present a collision and preimage security analysis of MDC-4, a 24 years old construction for transforming an n-bit block cipher into a 2n-bit hash function. We start with MDC-4 based on one single block cipher, and prove that any adversary with query access to the underlying block cipher requires at least 2 5n/8 queries (asymptotically) to find a collision. For the preimage resistance, we present a surprising negative result: for a target image with the same left and right half, a preimage for the full MDC-4 hash function can be found in 2 n queries. Yet, restricted to target images with different left and right halves, we prove that at least 2 5n/4 queries (asymptotically) are required to find a preimage. Next, we consider MDC-4 based on two independent block ciphers, a model that is less general but closer to the original design, and prove that the collision bound of 2 5n/8 queries and the preimage bound of 2 5n/4 queries apply to the MDC-4 compression function and hash function design. With these results, we are the first to formally confirm that MDC-4 offers a higher level of provable security compared to MDC-2.
Introduction
The focus of this work is the classical block cipher based hash function MDC-4. MDC-4 and its related hash function MDC-2 have first been described by Meyer and Schilling in 1988 [25] , and have been patented by Brachtl et al. in 1990 [4] . MDC-2 has been standardized in ISO/IEC 10118-2 [13] and is used in numerous applications (see [15, 28] for an exposition), while MDC-4 is part of the IBM CLiC cryptographic module [6, 7] . In their original specification, MDC-2 and MDC-4 are instantiated using the block cipher DES. In this work, we step away from this design criterion and consider the designs based on any block cipher E : Z n 2 × Z n 2 → Z n 2 with key and message length n bits (throughout, the first input to the block cipher is the key input).
MDC-2 is a Merkle-Damgård (MD) hash function design [5, 24] using a compression function f MDC-2 : Z 3n 2 → Z 2n 2 that internally calls the block cipher E twice. It additionally employs two mappings v and w, applied on the key inputs to the two block cipher calls. As v and w are originally constructed so as to have a distinct range 1 , we can consider MDC-2 to be based on two block ciphers E 1 (·, ·) = E(v(·), ·) and E 2 (·, ·) = E(w(·), ·) [28] . The compression function f MDC-2 : Z 3n 2 → Z 2n 2 is defined as follows.
f MDC-2 (A, B, C)
return (Y, Z).
Here, for a bit string X of even length we denote by X l and X r its left and right halves. f MDC-2 can be considered as a parallel evaluation of two Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO) constructions [22] followed by a swapping of the right halves of both states. Consequently, f MDC-2 does not achieve the desired level of security: finding a collision or a preimage for f MDC-2 is as hard as finding it for the two MMO constructions independently, hence requires about 2 n/2 or 2 n block cipher calls, respectively. For the full MDC-2 hash function, Knudsen et al. [15] demonstrated that roughly 2 n /n block cipher calls suffice for finding a collision, and about 2 n calls for finding a preimage. In 2007, Steinberger derived a nontrivial security lower bound on MDC-2 [28] . Steinberger considers the MDC-2 hash function using one single block cipher E modeled as an ideal cipher, and proves that any adversary with query access to
return (Y, Z). E requires at least 2 3n/5 queries (asymptotically) to find a collision. His proof relies on the observation that a collision for MDC-2 implies a collision for the last two rounds of MDC-2, except for some special cases. These results on MDC-2 are summarized in Table 1 ; all of these results hold for the case E 1 and E 2 are different block ciphers as for the case they are the same. The MDC-4 hash function differs from MDC-2 in the sense that its underlying compression function f MDC-4 makes four calls to the underlying block cipher rather than two. f MDC-4 is defined as two consecutive evaluations of f MDC-2 , where the message inputs to the MMO executions in the second evaluation are B for E 1 and A for E 2 . The definition of f MDC-4 : Z 3n 2 → Z 2n 2 is given in Fig. 1 . Knudsen and Preneel [16] showed that approximately 2 3n/4 block cipher executions suffice to find a collision for f . With respect to preimage resistance, the same authors report that 2 3n/2 calls suffice for finding a preimage for f MDC-4 and 2 7n/4 calls result in a preimage for MDC-4. The latter result is recently improved to 2 3n/2 by Hong and Kwon [12] . These results are summarized in Table 1 . In independent concurrent research, Fleischmann et al. [7, 8] analyzed the collision resistance of MDC-4. They proved that MDC-4 is collision secure up to approximately 2 3n/5 queries. Hence, they prove that the bound of Steinberger for MDC-2 also holds for MDC-4 (in fact, numerically their bound is worse than the bound on MDC-2). A preimage security lower bound has so far never been derived. Since the introduction of the functions in [4, 25] , however, the MDC-4 hash function has always been considered the more secure variant of MDC-2. Although mainly a matter of theoretical interest (given that MDC-2 is twice as fast as MDC-4), formal security lower bounds for MDC-4 or f MDC-4 that confirm this longstanding claim have never been derived. In particular, for years the MDC-4 structure has not been thoroughly analyzed, which makes it impossible to classify MDC-4 among other double block length constructions known in literature (see "Related Work").
Our Contributions
In this work, we formally analyze the collision and (everywhere) preimage security of MDC-4 and its underlying f MDC-4 compression function of Fig. 1 . We start with considering the general setting where f MDC-4 is built on one block cipher E = E 1 = E 2 , the single block cipher setting. Then, we consider the more constrained double block cipher setting, where MDC-4 is based on two independently distributed ciphers E 1 and E 2 .
Single block cipher setting. A customary approach for proving collision and preimage resistance of a hash function is to analyze the compression function first and use a preservation result to show that the findings also apply to the full hash function. However, when the two block ciphers underlying MDC-4 are modeled as one single random block cipher E, collisions and preimages for f MDC-4 can be found in at most 2 n/2 and 2 n block cipher calls, respectively: one focuses on state values with the same left and right Table 1 . Known security results for the MDC-2 and MDC-4 compression and hash functions. The security bound gives a lower bound and the attack bound gives an upper bound on the number of queries in order to find an attack. By "(triv)" we note that the bound is trivial; these bounds come from the security of the MMO construction [3] , or correspond to generic attacks. The results printed in bold are derived in this work. collision preimage ideal primitives security attack security attack [12] half (for Fig. 1 this means A = B and Y = Z, and consequently S = T , U = V , and W = X), and the security boils down to the security of two subsequent MMO evaluations. For the preimage resistance, these type of target images (with Y = Z) can be considered as weak images, these give the adversary significantly more power. In any case, the security preservation approach does not help us out here, and instead we consider the security of the MDC-4 hash function design directly.
Starting with collision resistance, we formally prove that any adversary with query access to E, modeled as an ideal cipher, needs at least 2 5n/8 queries (asymptotically) to find a collision for MDC-4. This is beyond the collision bound 2 3n/5 on MDC-2 by Steinberger [28] and on MDC-4 concurrently derived by Fleischmann et al. [7, 8] . The proof consists of two parts: given that the initial value of MDC-4 consists of two different halves, we prove that all intermediate state values of a MDC-4 evaluation consist of different halves, except with a small probability. Then, it suffices to analyze collision resistance of f MDC-4 restricted to state values with different left and right halves, which we prove up to at least 2 5n/8 queries. At the first glance, as f MDC-4 roughly consists of two evaluations of f MDC-2 , one is inclined to say the results of Steinberger [28] directly carry over. However, this is not true due to the differences at the second f MDC-2 evaluation where the inputs are swapped and the message inputs differ for the left and right cipher. Instead, we conduct a new collision resistance proof for f MDC-4 , and although it shows some similarities with the proof of Steinberger, it differs in many aspects and uses several new ideas to facilitate the analysis.
For (everywhere) preimage resistance, we derive a more surprising result, namely that if the target image (Y, Z) satisfies Y = Z, a preimage for the MDC-4 hash function can be found in approximately 2 n queries. The attack resembles ideas from the preimage attack on MDC-2 by Knudsen et al. [15] and from above-described preimage attack on f MDC-4 in the single block cipher setting. We stress that the attack does not apply to the original MDC-4 design due to the domain separation by the functions v and w. On the other hand, if the target image satisfies Y = Z, we prove that any adversary requires at least 2 5n/4 queries (asymptotically) to find a preimage for f MDC-4 or MDC-4, hence security beyond the birthday bound is achieved. In order to achieve security beyond 2 n queries, we employ the ideas of free queries and wish lists. These proof tools have been used before by Armknecht et al. and Lee et al. [2, 21] for compression functions based on two block cipher calls (see "Related Work"), but because MDC-4 makes four block cipher calls rather than two, and additionally the corresponding wish lists are much harder to bound, the security proof has become considerably more complex. We remark that target images with the same left and right half are rather rare, 2 n out of 2 2n target images satisfy this property. If we had opted for preimage resistance where the challenge is randomly generated, we obtain in the single block cipher setting a security bound of approximately 2 5n/4 queries for f MDC-4 and MDC-4, rather than the bound of 2 n queries.
The findings on MDC-4 based on one block cipher E are included in Table 1 .
Double block cipher setting. As a second part of this paper, we consider the security of the MDC-4 design where the two block ciphers E 1 and E 2 are modeled as two independent ideal ciphers. We note that, despite its more constrained character, this model is closer to the original design due to the domain separation by the functions v and w. We show that in this model, any adversary with query access to E 1 and E 2 , needs at least 2 5n/8 queries (asymptotically) to find a collision for f MDC-4 and at least 2 5n/4 queries (asymptotically) to find a preimage for f MDC-4 . These results almost immediately follow from the results in the single block cipher setting. Note that here we do not make the restriction that the state values should consist of different halves. Because MDC-4 is a MD transform, it preserves collision and (everywhere) preimage resistance [1] , which means that if the compression function satisfies these security notions, then so does the hash function. Therefore, these results for f MDC-4 directly carry over to the MDC-4 hash function.
With the 2 5n/8 collision and 2 5n/4 preimage security bounds we have formally confirmed the widespread belief that MDC-4 offers a higher level of security compared to MDC-2. Despite that this security gain is obtained at the price of efficiency loss, it is an interesting and important result that allows us to make a fairer comparison among the double block length hash functions and that gives us more insight in the possibilities and impossibilities of block cipher based hashing. In particular, to our knowledge this is the first time the preimage resistance of a double block length compression function design with more than two block cipher evaluations is analyzed. Given that MDC-4 is originally not constructed from a provable security point of view (but rather an efficiency point of view), more elaborate designs with more than two block cipher calls may likely offer a higher level of security; our work is a good starting point for this research direction. Although our findings improve the existing bounds on MDC-4 significantly, large gaps between the security bounds and the best known attacks remain. A more technical and elaborate analysis may result in better bounds, and it remains an interesting open problem to improve the security bounds or the generic attacks for MDC-2 and MDC-4.
Related Work
Closely related to this work are the classical double block length compression functions Abreast-DM and Tandem-DM [17] and Hirose's compression function [11] , as well as the general compression function designs by Hirose [10] andÖzen and Stam [26] . And in fact, these constructions all beat MDC-2 and MDC-4 with respect to collision and preimage resistance. Each of these constructions is provided with almost optimal collision security (see Fleischmann et al. [9] and Lee and Kwon [18] for Abreast-DM, see Lee et al. [20] for Tandem-DM). With respect to preimage resistance, Armknecht et al. and Lee et al. [2, 21] prove security of Abreast-DM, Tandem-DM and Hirose's compression function up to almost 2 2n queries (as mentioned, our preimage resistance proof of MDC-4 employs some proof ideas from [2, 21] ). These double block length constructions, however, all fundamentally differ from MDC-2 and MDC-4 in the sense that their underlying block ciphers have a double key size, i.e. they use a block cipher E : Z 2n 2 × Z n 2 → Z n 2 that clearly allows for higher compression and that renders a much stronger underlying assumption. Regarding primitives using an n-bit key block cipher, an interesting design is by Jetchev et al. [14] , who presented a two-call function achieving 2 2n/3 collision and 2 n preimage security. In [23] , Mennink presented a class of compression functions making three block cipher calls with optimal 2 n collision security and preimage security up to 2 3n/2 queries.
Outline
In Sect. 2, we introduce some mathematical background and the security model used in this work. The security result on the collision resistance of MDC-4 (based on one block cipher E = E 1 = E 2 ) is given in Sect. 3, along with its formal security proof. In Sect. 4, we present our security result on the preimage resistance of MDC-4 (based on E). In Sect. 5, we discuss the implications of these results to the MDC-4 design based on two block ciphers E 1 , E 2 .
Preliminaries
For n ∈ N, by Z n 2 we denote the set of bit strings of length n. For two bit strings X, Y , by X Y we denote their concatenation and by X ⊕ Y their bitwise XOR. If X is of even length, we denote by X l and X r its left and right halves. Throughout, we assume n is even. We denote by Bloc(n) the set of all block ciphers E : Z n 2 × Z n 2 → Z n 2 , where the first input corresponds to the key input.
An adversary A is a probabilistic algorithm with oracle access to two block ciphers E 1 , E 2 $ ← Bloc(n) randomly sampled from Bloc(n) (the security model for the single block cipher setting follows after straightforward simplifications). We consider the adversary to be information-theoretic, which means that it has unbounded computational power, and that its complexity is measured by the number of queries made to its oracles. The adversary can make forward and inverse queries to E 1 and E 2 . The queries are stored in a query history Q as elements (k i , K i , x i , y i ), where i is the index of the query, k i ∈ {1, 2} indicates the corresponding block cipher, K i is the key input, and x i and y i denote the (plaintext) input and (ciphertext) output of the block cipher. By x i ⊕ y i , we define its XOR-output. The index i and the parameter k are omitted if they are irrelevant or clear from the context. For q ≥ 0, by Q q we define the query history afterueries. We assume that the adversary never makes queries to which it knows the answer in advance. In this work, we consider two types of adversaries, namely one that aims at finding collisions and one that aims at finding preimages for f MDC-4 .
We say that adversary A finds a collision for f MDC-4 if it obtains a query history Q that allows it to output two distinct tuples (
and for which Q contains all block cipher queries required to compute the two evaluations of f MDC-4 . We define by
the probability that A succeeds in finding such query history, and define by adv With respect to preimage resistance, we opt for the notion of everywhere preimage resistance [27] . This security notion intuitively guarantees preimage security for every range point. Before making queries to its oracles, the (preimage finding) adversary A decides on a range point (Y, Z) ∈ Z 2n 2 . We say that A finds a preimage for f MDC-4 if it obtains a query history Q that allows it to output a tuple (A, B, C) ∈ Z 3n 2 such that f MDC-4 (A, B, C) = (Y, Z) and for which Q contains all block cipher queries required to compute the evaluation of f MDC-4 . We define by
the maximum probability that A succeeds in finding such query history, and define by adv epre f (q) the maximum (everywhere) preimage advantage taken over all adversaries makingueries. By adv
The security definitions for the full MDC-4 hash function are defined similarly. Here, rather than tuples from Z 3n 2 the adversary outputs messages of arbitrary length. Throughout, we denote the initial state value of MDC-4 by (F 0 , G 0 ). In the single block cipher setting, we consider one block cipher E to be generated randomly from Bloc(n) rather than two, and the definitions follow immediately. In the remainder of this work, it is clear from the context which of the security models we consider. Theorem 1. Let n ∈ Z n 2 and q < 2 n−1 . Let t 1 , t 2 , t 3 > 0 be any integral values. Then,
The proof of Thm. 1 is given in Sect. 3.1. It shows similarities with the proof by Steinberger [28] of collision resistance of the MDC-2 hash function, but its structure is entirely different so as to facilitate the proof. The proof is based on using thresholds t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , and (1) holds for any choice of these values. We elaborate on this threshold approach after Thm. 2.
Employing this result, we now obtain the main result for the collision resistance of MDC-4 using a single block cipher E.
Theorem 2. Let n ∈ Z n 2 and q < 2 n−1 . Let t 1 , t 2 , t 3 > 0 be any integral values. Then,
The proof of Thm. 2 is given in Sect. 3.2, and we give a brief intuition. Recall that the attack on f MDC-4 relies on the fact that the two halves of the evaluation can be the same. However, for a full MDC-4 iteration, the initial state value consists of two different halves, and in fact all intermediate state values consist of two different halves, except with some small probability. Now, by ways of collision resistance preservation [1] , the result of Thm. 1 carries over with as additional term a bound on the probability that the adversary ends up with a state value with two the same halves.
The proof derived for Thm. 2 (similarly for Thm. 1) is based on using threshold values t 1 , t 2 , t 3 . This is a proof approach that has for instance been employed in [20, 23, 28] . The intuitive idea of this approach is to split the "hard" event (finding collisions) into two "less hard" events, where the thresholds form a balance between the two events: for smaller values of the thresholds, one event happens with a larger probability and the other one with a smaller probability. Due to this approach, one can divide the bound of (2) into two parts. The first term forms the first part and increases for increasing parameters t 1 , t 2 , t 3 . The remaining three terms form the second part that decreases for increasing t 1 , t 2 , t 3 .
Clearly, for naive choices of the values the bound of (2) becomes non-informative: for instance, if t 1 = 1 the term 2q 2 2 n appears and the bound indicates security up to approximately 2 n/2 queries. However, (2) holds for all integral values t 1 , t 2 , t 3 > 0, so we can equivalently state the bound as
, where t 1 , t 2 , t 3 may depend on n. For obtaining a sharp bound, we need to fine tune the integral positive parameters t 1 , t 2 , t 3 so that this bound is as low as possible: the trick is to take parameters t 1 , t 2 , t 3 minimal so that the second part of (2) still goes to 0 for n → ∞. We will show that the advantage of any adversary making slightly less than 2 5n/8 queries approaches 0 when n goes to infinity. To this end, let ε > 0 be any parameter, we consider any adversary making at most q = 2 5n/8 /n ε queries to its oracle. We set t 1 = 2 2n/8 , t 2 = 2 n/8 , and t 3 = 3. Here, for simplicity we assume t 1 , t 2 to be integral. If n is no multiple of 8, one sets t 1 , t 2 to the nearest integers. Note that these parameters satisfy t 1 > q 2 2 n , t 2 > q 2 n/2 and t 3 > q 2 n , which are minimal requirements for the second part of (2) to be < 1. Now, it is an easy exercise to verify that the bound of (2) approaches 0 for n → ∞ when q = 2 5n/8 /n ε and t 1 , t 2 , t 3 are as specified. (2) for n = 128, in comparison with the trivial bound q(q + 1)/2 n (dashed line). t 1 , t 2 to facilitate the analysis for smaller n and smaller q (the previously chosen values were set to analyze limiting behavior for n, q), we see an improvement over the best known bound and the bound independently derived in [7, 8] . For n = 128 the collision resistance advantage hits 1/2 for log 2 q ≈ 77.5, which is smaller than the threshold for q 8 /2 5n , 79.9. For larger values of n, by Cor. 1 the difference goes to 0 for n → ∞.
Proof of Thm. 1
The collision resistance proof shows some similarities with the proof of Steinberger for MDC-2 [28] , but fundamentally differs in various aspects and is as such of independent interest. In particular, due to a different and more structured case distinction we obtain a sharper bound (security up to 2 5n/8 queries) than the bound of Steinberger for MDC-2 (security up to 2 3n/5 queries). Also, our proof improves over the proof by Fleischmann et al. [7, 8] , who basically confirmed that the 2 3n/5 bound of MDC-2 applies to MDC-4 too.
We consider any adversary makingueries to its oracle E, which tries to find a collision for f MDC-4 . Finding a collision corresponds to obtaining a query history Q q of size q that satisfies configuration col(Q q ) of Fig. 3 . In other words,
and we consider the probability of obtaining any query history Q q that satisfies configuration col(Q q ). Notice that in this configuration, we omit the shifting at the end: as this shifting is bijective, it does not influence the collision finding advantage. In Fig. 3 , as well as in all subsequent figures in this section, we label the block ciphers as follows to uniquely identify their positions. In the left word of Fig. 3 (with inputs (A 1 , B 1 , C 1 )) the block ciphers are labeled 1tl, 1tr, 1bl, 1br, for top/bottom left/right. For the right word the block ciphers are identified as 2tl, 2tr, 2bl, 2br. In the remainder, when talking about "a query 1tl", we mean "a query that in a collision occurs at position 1tl" (and the same for the other positions). The capitalized variables in the figures may take any value, and are simply used to accentuate relations among the two words. We need to evaluate the probability of the adversary finding a query history Q q that satisfies configuration col(Q q ) of Fig. 3 . For this analysis we introduce a helping event help(Q q ). Let t 1 , t 2 , t 3 > 0 be integral. Event help(Q q ) is satisfied if either of the following sub-events help k (Q q ) (k = 1, . . . , 4) occurs.
By basic probability theory, we obtain for (3):
For the analysis of the event col(Q q ), it may be the case that a single query occurs at multiple positions in the configuration. Therefore, we divide col(Q q ) into sub-configurations. For two distinct positions a, b ∈ {1tl, 1tr, 1bl, 1br, 2tl, 2tr, 2bl, 2br} and a binary value α ∈ {0, 1}, by a = b ≡ α we say that the same query occurs at both positions a and b if and only if α = 1. Now, we define for α tl , α tr , α bl , α br ∈ {0, 1} the sub-configuration col α tl αtrα bl α br (Q) as col(Q) of Fig. 3 with the restriction that
Clearly,
It may be the case that the same query occurs at positions 1tl and 1br or 2br, but as becomes clear these cases are included in the analysis. By (3-5), we obtain the following bound on adv
The probabilities constituting to the sum of (6) are analyzed in Lems. 1-6 as further set forth in Table  2 . Probability Pr (help(Q q )) is analyzed in Lem. 7. In this section we only include the proof of Lem. 1. The proofs of Lems. 2-7 are given in App. A. Table 2 . For α tl , α tr , α bl , α br ∈ {0, 1}, the probability bound on col α tl αtrα bl α br (Q q ) ∧ ¬help(Q q ) (cf. (6)) is analyzed in the corresponding lemma. 
Proof. A visualization of configuration col 0000 (Q q ) can be found in Fig. 4 . In this figure, the queries corresponding to locations a and !a are required to be different, and the same for the queries at positions (b, !b), (c, !c) and (d, !d). For the analysis of col 0000 (Q q ) ∧ ¬help(Q q ), we say that the i-th query (i ∈ {1, . . . , q}) is successful if it makes configuration col 0000 (Q i ) satisfied and ¬help(Q i ) holds. Now, by basic probability theory, we can analyze the probability of the i-th query being successful, and sum over i = 1, . . . , q. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. We will analyze the probability of the i-th query to be successful, i.e. to satisfy col 0000 (Q i ) ∧ ¬help(Q i ). If help(Q i ) holds, the i-th query can certainly not be successful, so we assume ¬help(Q i ) and analyze the probability the i-th query makes col 0000 (Q i ) satisfied.
Without loss of generality (by symmetry), the i-th query occurs in the left word. It may be the case that the i-th query also occurs in the right word (e.g. at 2br), but as becomes clear from the proof, this case is automatically included. Note that, as A 1 = B 1 , it can impossibly occur at (1tl, 1tr) or (1bl, 1br). Therefore, without loss of generality (by symmetry) it suffices to analyze the cases the query occurs at the following positions: 1tl only, 1br only, (1tl, 1br) only, or (1tl, 1bl) only. We distinguish among these four cases.
Query occurs at 1tl only. By ¬help 1 (Q i
, which happens with probability at most 1 2 n −q . The total probability is at most
2 n −q . Query occurs at 1br only. By ¬help 1 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 1 choices for (1bl, 2bl). For any of these ≤ t 1 choices, let K 2bl be the key input corresponding to position 2bl. By ¬help 2 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 2 choices for 2tr. For any of these ≤ t 1 t 2 choices 2tr, the query at position 2tl and consequently the query at position 2br is uniquely determined, and so is the XOR-output Z of 2br. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output equals this value Z, which happens with probability at most 1 2 n −q . The total success probability is at most
Query occurs at 1tl and 1br only. Let K be the key input for the i-th query. As the query occurs at both positions, we require K l = Z l , which fixes Z l . By ¬help 2 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 2 choices for 2br. For any of these ≤ t 2 choices 2br, we obtain a different Z. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output equals this value Z, which happens with probability at most 1 2 n −q . The total success probability is at most t 2 2 n −q . Query occurs at 1tl and 1bl only. Let K be the key input for the i-th query. As the query occurs at both positions, we require K r = Y r , which fixes Y r . By ¬help 3 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 2 choices for 2bl. For any of these ≤ t 2 choices 2bl, we obtain a different Y . The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output equals this value Y , which happens with probability at most 1 2 n −q . The total success probability is at most
The i-th query is successful with probability at most
. The claimed bound is obtained by summing over i = 1, . . . , q.
2 )q 2 n −q for α tl α tr α bl α br ∈ {0001, 0010}.
for α tl α tr α bl α br ∈ {0100, 1000}.
for α tl α tr α bl α br ∈ {0101, 1010}.
Lemma 6. Pr (col α tl αtrα bl α br (Q q ) ∧ ¬help(Q q )) = 0 for α tl α tr α bl α br ∈ {11 * * , 1 * * 1, * 11 * }. Fig. 4 . Configuration col 0000 (Q) of Lem. 1. We require (A 1 , B 1 , C 1 ) = (A 2 , B 2 , C 2 ), A 1 = B 1 , and
We are ready to finish the proof of Thm. 1. Lemmas 1-7 imply for adv
(q) of (6):
where t 1 , t 2 , t 3 > 0 are integral. The result of Thm. 1 is obtained by observing that 2 n − q > 2 n−1 for q < 2 n−1 .
Proof of Thm. 2
As explained in Sect. 3 we essentially only need to consider the probability that an adversary finds an f MDC-4 evaluation where the state consists of two different halves and the output state consists of two the same halves. The formal treatment of this is more elaborate.
We consider any adversary makingueries to its oracle E, which tries to find a collision for MDC-4. Denote by (F 0 , G 0 ) the initial state value of MDC-4, where F 0 = G 0 . Suppose the adversary finds a collision, i.e. two lists
of internal state values of the two evaluations, where k, k ≥ 1 and (
. . , k = k , and we consider non-trivial collisions only. If the adversary finds a collision of this form, we can distinguish between the following two cases:
(1) F i = G i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and F i = G i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k }; (2) F i = G i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k} or F i = G i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k }.
Suppose the adversary finds a collision in case (1). This implies (by basic collision security preservation [1] ) the adversary necessarily needs to obtain a query history Q q of size q that satisfies configuration col(Q q ) of Fig. 3 .
On the other hand, suppose the adversary finds a collision in case (2) . Without loss of generality, a state-half collision occurs in the first word. As F 0 = G 0 , there exists an i such that F i = G i but F i−1 = G i−1 . This means that in this case the adversary necessarily needs to obtain a query history Q q of size q that satisfies configuration statecol(Q q ) of Fig. 5 . Here, Z represents F i = G i and (A, B) represents (F i−1 , G i−1 ). As in Sect. 3.1, in this configuration we have omitted the shifting at the end. We stress that this does not harm the security analysis. We label the block ciphers tl, . . . , br. Concluding, we find
We employ the helping event help(Q q ) from Sect. 3.1, and obtain for (7):
For the first two probabilities, the proof of Thm. 1 applies. The probability bound on statecol(Q q ) ∧ ¬help(Q q ) is analyzed in Lem. 8.
Proof. We consider configuration statecol(Q q ) of Fig. 5 . The proof idea is the same as the proof of Lem. 1. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. As in Lem. 1, we assume ¬help(Q i ) and analyze the probability the i-th query makes statecol(Q i ) satisfied.
Recall that the positions in Fig. 5 are simply referred to as tl, tr, bl, br, without a leading 1. Without loss of generality (by symmetry), the i-th query occurs at the following positions: tl only, bl only, (tl, br) only, or (tl, bl) only. Note that, as A = B, it can impossibly occur at (tl, tr) or (bl, br).
Query occurs at tl only. By ¬help 1 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 1 choices for (bl, br). For any of these ≤ t 1 choices, let K bl and K br be the key inputs corresponding to positions bl and br. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output equals K l br K r bl , which happens with probability at most 1 2 n −q . The total success probability is at most t 1 2 n −q . Query occurs at bl only. Let K be the key input for the i-th query. By ¬help 2 (Q i ) and ¬help 3 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 2 choices for tl and ≤ t 2 choices for tr. For any of these ≤ t 2 2 choices, the query at position br is uniquely determined, and so is the XOR-output Z of br. The i-th query is successful only if its XORoutput equals this value Z, which happens with probability at most 1 2 n −q . The total success probability is at most t 2 2 2 n −q . Query occurs at tl and br only. Let K be the key input for the i-th query. As the query occurs at both positions, we require K l = Z l , which fixes Z l . By ¬help 2 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 2 choices for bl. For any of these ≤ t 2 choices bl, we obtain a different Z. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output equals this value Z, which happens with probability at most 1 2 n −q . The total success probability is at most t 2 2 n −q . Query occurs at tl and bl only. Let K be the key input for the i-th query. As the query occurs at both positions, we require K r = Z r , which fixes Z r . By ¬help 3 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 2 choices for br. For any of these ≤ t 2 choices br, we obtain a different Z. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output equals this value Z, which happens with probability at most 1 2 n −q . The total success probability is at most
The i-th query is successful with probability at most t 1 +2t 2 +t 2 2 2 n −q . The claimed bound is obtained by summing over i = 1, . . . , q.
We are ready to finish the proof of Thm. 2. The findings of Sect. 3.1 and Lem.8 imply for (8) :
where t 1 , t 2 , t 3 > 0 are integral. The result of Thm. 2 is obtained by observing that 2 n − q > 2 n−1 for q < 2 n−1 .
Preimage Resistance of MDC-4
We analyze the preimage security of MDC-4 in the case the two underlying block ciphers are identical, i.e. E = E 1 = E 2 . Let (Y, Z) be the target image. We distinguish between Y = Z and Y = Z. Y = Z. If the two halves of the image are the same, a preimage for the compression function f MDC-4 can be found in about 2 n queries (cf. Sect. 1): one focuses on preimages with the same left and right halves A = B, in which case it suffices to find A, C such that
We demonstrate that this weakness propagates through the iteration of the MDC-4 hash function, resulting in an everywhere preimage attack for the MDC-4 hash function in 2 n queries (on average). We recall that everywhere preimage resistance is defined as the maximum advantage over all images, thus including the weak images consisting of two identical halves. If we had opted for preimage resistance where the challenge is randomly generated, this preimage attack succeeds only with small probability as 2 n out of 2 2n target images are weak.
The attack uses ideas from Knudsen et al. [15] to find preimages for MDC-2. It is a meet-in-themiddle attack and at a high level works as follows. First, one constructs a tree with 2 n leaves with root (Y, Z). The edges in this tree correspond to evaluations of f MDC-4 . In the general case, the construction of this tree requires the adversary to find approximately 2 n+1 preimages, but as turns out for f MDC-4 the workload is significantly lower. Then, starting from the initial value (F 0 , G 0 ), one varies the message input C to hit any of the 2 n leaves. In more detail, the attack works as follows: Step 1 requires 2 n+2 block cipher queries.
Step 4 is a brute force attack and requires approximately 4 · (2 2n /2 n ) evaluations of E. In total, this attack requires approximately 2 n+3 queries. The attack has time and space complexity O(2 n ). Y = Z. For the everywhere preimage resistance of the f MDC-4 compression function of Fig. 1 with the restriction that Y = Z, we derive the following results. The findings directly carry over to MDC-4 as it is a MD transform, which preserves everywhere preimage resistance [1] . (q) of (9) for n = 128, in comparison with the best known bound q/2 n (dashed line).
Theorem 3. Let n ∈ Z n 2 . Let t 1 , t 2 > 0 be any integral values with t 1 ≤ q. Then, provided the image
The proof of Thm. 3 is given in Sect. 4.1. It employs ideas of the preimage resistance proof by Armknecht et al. [2] and Lee et al. [19, 21] for double block length compression functions, namely the issuance of free queries and the usage of wish lists. However, the analysis has become considerably more complex because the MDC-4 compression function uses four block ciphers rather than two, and consequently the derivation of bounds on the sizes of the wish lists has become more elaborate. The bound of (9) can be analyzed in a similar manner as is done in Sect. 3, and we skip the details. Let ε > 0 be any parameter, we consider any adversary making at most q = 2 5n/4 /n ε queries to its oracle. We set t 1 = 2 3n/4 and t 2 = 2 n/4 /n ε/2 . Again, t 1 , t 2 are assumed to be integral. Note that for interesting values of ε, we have t 1 ≤ q as desired. As before, it immediately follows that the bound of (9) approaches 0 for n → ∞ when q = 2 5n/4 /n ε and t 1 , t 2 are as specified. for n = 128 is given in Fig. 6 . As in the case of Sect. 3, we have slightly adjusted the parameters t 1 , t 2 to facilitate the analysis for smaller n and smaller q. For n = 128 the preimage resistance advantage hits 1/2 for log 2 q ≈ 151.9. Also in this case, the gap between this value and threshold for q 4 /2 5n , 159.75, is caused by the choice for small n. By Cor. 2 the difference goes to 0 for n → ∞.
Proof of Thm. 3
We consider any adversary makingueries to its oracle E, which tries to find a preimage for f MDC-4 . Let (Y, Z) ∈ Z 2n 2 be the point to invert, chosen by the adversary prior to making any query. Finding a preimage for (Y, Z) corresponds to obtaining a query history Q q of size q that satisfies configuration pre(Q q ) of Fig. 7 . In other words,
and we consider the probability of obtaining any query history Q q that satisfies configuration pre(Q q ).
As is done in Sect. 3.1, we again omit the bijective shifting at the end as it does not influence the preimage security. We use the same convention for the figures as is used in Sect. 3.1, with the difference that in Fig. 7 the variables Y, Z are underlined to denote that these are fixed. As we only consider one word (rather than two, in Sect. 3.1), we label the block ciphers simply as tl, tr, bl, br for top/bottom left/right. The analysis in this section relies on the issuance of free super queries [2, 19, 21] . If the adversary has made 2 n−1 queries to E under the same key, it will receive the remaining 2 n−1 queries for this key for free. As in [2, 21] , we call this query a super query. Formally, these free queries can be modeled as queries the adversary is forced to make, but at no charge. For convenience, we use Q q to denote the query history after q normal queries. This query history thus contains all normal queries plus all super queries made so far. A super query is a set of 2 n−1 single queries, and any query in the query history is either a normal query or a part of a super query, but not both. Notice that the adversary needs 2 n−1 queries as preparatory work to enforce a super query. As the adversary makes at mostueries, at most q/2 n−1 super queries will occur.
For the analysis of pre(Q q ), we introduce a helping event help(Q q ). Let t 1 , t 2 > 0 be integral. Event help(Q q ) is satisfied if either of the following sub-events help k (Q q ) (k = 1, 2, 3) occurs.
These helping events are the same as the ones used in the proof of collision resistance in Sect. 3.1, but are reintroduced for simplicity. Note that help 3 (Q q ) particularly covers the values Y, Z as XOR-outputs. By basic probability theory, we obtain for (10):
In Lem. 9, we bound Pr (pre(Q q ) ∧ ¬help(Q q )) and probability Pr (help(Q q )) is analyzed in Lem. 10. The proofs are given in App. B.
Lemma 10. Provided t 1 ≤ q, we have
.
With respect to Lem. 10, we note that help 3 (Q) is similar to the event Lucky(Q) analyzed by Armknecht et al. [2] and Lee et al. [21] : the only difference is that help 3 (Q) is required to hold for any z ∈ Z n 2 . In their analysis of Lucky(Q), [2, 21] make a distinction between the normal and super queries (just as we do in the proof of Lem. 10) but for the super queries their analysis is based on Markov's inequality and is consequently much simpler. However, because our helping events are required to hold for any z ∈ Z n 2 (event help 3 (Q)) and for any z ∈ Z n/2 2 (event help 1∨2 (Q)), a similar approach using Markov's inequality would result in a trivial bound and a more elaborate treatment was required.
The proof of Thm. 3 is finished by adding the bounds of Lems. 9-10, as set forth in (10-11).
5 Security of MDC-4 with Two Distinct Block Ciphers E 1 , E 2
We consider the collision and preimage resistance of MDC-4 in the setting where the two block ciphers E 1 , E 2 are independently distributed. Although the analysis of MDC-4 with one block cipher is more general, the MDC-4 mode of operation with two independent block cipher is much closer to the original design due to the domain separation by the functions v and w (see Sect. 1). In this setting, the following results can be obtained by straightforward simplifications of the proofs of Thms. 1 and 3.
Starting with collision resistance, we obtain the following results. They directly carry over to MDC-4 as it is a MD transform, which preserves collision resistance [1] . We stress that we pose no limitation on the state values.
Theorem 4. Let n ∈ Z n 2 and q < 2 n−1 . Let t 1 , t 2 , t 3 > 0 be any integral values. Then,
. (12) In the proof of Thm. 1, the restrictions A 1 = B 1 and A 2 = B 2 are essentially used to guarantee that the queries occurring at positions (1tl, 1tr) are distinct, and so are the ones at (1bl, 1br). But as, regarding Thm. 4, E 1 , E 2 are independently distributed this is directly guaranteed. The bound of Thm. 4 immediately follows by leaving out some cases in the proof of Thm. 1 (such as for col 0000 (Q q ) the case that the last query appears at (1tl, 1bl)). By a similar reasoning as before, Cor. 1 applies to adv
By the same arguments, we find the following bound on the preimage resistance. Corollary 2 applies to adv epre f MDC-4 (q) too. The results directly carry over to MDC-4 as it is a MD transform, which preserves everywhere preimage resistance [1] .
Theorem 5. Let n ∈ Z n 2 . Let t 1 , t 2 > 0 be any integral values with t 1 ≤ q. Then, Fig. 9 . Configuration col 0011 (Q) of Lem. 3. We require C 1 = C 2 and A = B. i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. As in Lem. 1, we assume ¬help(Q i ) and analyze the probability the i-th query makes col 0001 (Q i ) satisfied.
Without loss of generality (by symmetry), the i-th query occurs at the following positions: 1tl only, 1tr only, 1bl only, (1tr, 1bl) only, or (1tl, 1bl) only. We distinguish among these five cases. Note that, as A 1 = B, it can impossibly occur at (1tl, 1tr). It may be the case that the i-th query also occurs in the right word, but this case is automatically included. Query occurs at 1tl only. By ¬help 1 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 1 choices for (1bl, 2bl). For any of these ≤ t 1 choices, let K 1bl and K 2bl be the key inputs corresponding to positions 1bl and 2bl. By ¬help 3 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 2 choices for 2tl. For any of these ≤ t 1 t 2 choices 2tl, we obtain a different X. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output equals X K r 1bl , which happens with probability at most 1 2 n −q . The total success probability is at most
Query occurs at 1tr only. By ¬help 1 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 1 choices for (1bl, 2bl). For any of these ≤ t 1 choices, let K 1bl and K 2bl be the key inputs corresponding to positions 1bl and 2bl. By ¬help 2 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 2 choices for 2tr. For any of these ≤ t 1 t 2 choices 2tr, we obtain a different Y . The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output equals K l 1bl Y , which happens with probability at most 1 2 n −q . The total success probability is at most t 1 t 2 2 n −q . Query occurs at 1bl only: inverse query x ← E −1 (K, y). By ¬help 3 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 2 choices for 1tl. For any of these ≤ t 2 choices, let K 1tl be the key input corresponding to position 1tl. The i-th query is successful only if x = K 1tl , which happens with probability at most 1 2 n −q . The total success probability is at most t 2 2 n −q . Query occurs at 1bl only: forward query y ← E(K, x). By ¬help 2 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 2 choices for 1tr. For any of these ≤ t 2 choices 1tr, the query at position 1tl is uniquely determined (it requires key input x and message input C 1 defined by query 1tr), and so are the strings (B, X). By ¬help 2 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 2 choices for 2tl. For any of these ≤ t 2 2 choices 2tl, the query at position 2tr is uniquely determined (it requires key input B and message input C 2 defined by query 2tl). Consequently, the query at position 2br is uniquely determined, and so is the XOR-output Z of 2br. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output equals this value Z, which happens with probability at most 1 2 n −q . The total success probability is at most t 2 2 2 n −q . Query occurs at 1tr and 1bl only. Let K be the key input for the i-th query. As the query occurs at both positions, we require K l = Z l , which fixes Z l . By ¬help 2 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 2 choices for 2bl. For any of these ≤ t 2 choices 2bl, we obtain a different Z. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output equals this value Z, which happens with probability at most 1 2 n −q . The total success probability is at most t 2 2 n −q . Query occurs at 1tl and 1bl only. Let K be the key input for the i-th query. As the query occurs at both positions, we require K r = Z r , which fixes Z r . By ¬help 3 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 2 choices for 2bl. For any of these ≤ t 2 choices 2bl, we obtain a different Z. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output equals this value Z, which happens with probability at most 1 2 n −q . The total success probability is at most
A.2 Proof of Lem. 3
A visualization of configuration col 0011 (Q q ) can be found in Fig. 9 . For the basic proof idea, we refer to the proof of Lem. 1. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. As in Lem. 1, we assume ¬help(Q i ) and analyze the probability the i-th query makes col 0011 (Q i ) satisfied.
Without loss of generality (by symmetry), the i-th query occurs at the position 1tl only. Note that, as A = B, it can impossibly occur at (1tl, 1tr). It may be the case that the i-th query also occurs in the right word, but these cases is automatically included.
Query occurs at 1tl. By ¬help 1 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 1 choices for (1tr, 2tr). For any of these ≤ t 1 choices, as A is fixed (it equals the key input for the i-th query) the query at position 2tl is uniquely determined, and so is the XOR-output Y of 2tl. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output equals this value Y , which happens with probability at most 1 2 n −q . The total success probability is at most
The i-th query is successful with probability at most t 1 2 n −q . The claimed bound is obtained by summing over i = 1, . . . , q.
A.3 Proof of Lem. 4
The cases are equivalent by symmetry, and we consider col 0100 (Q q ) only. A visualization of configuration col 0100 (Q q ) can be found in Fig. 10 . For the basic proof idea, we refer to the proof of Lem. 1. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. As in Lem. 1, we assume ¬help(Q i ) and analyze the probability the i-th query makes col 0100 (Q i ) satisfied.
Without loss of generality (by symmetry), the i-th query occurs at the following positions: 1tl only, 1bl only, 1br only, (1tl, 1br) only, or (1tl, 1bl) only. We distinguish among these five cases. Note that, as A 1 = B, it can impossibly occur at (1bl, 1br). It may be the case that the i-th query also occurs in the right word, but this case is automatically included.
Query occurs at 1tl only. We note that the query at position 1tr = 2tr is not depicted in Fig. 10 but is defined as a query (2, B, C, W X ⊕ C). By ¬help 1 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 1 choices for queries at positions (1br, 2br). For any of these ≤ t 1 choices, let K 1br and K 2br be the key inputs corresponding to positions 1br and 2br. By ¬help 2 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 2 choices for 2tl. For any of these ≤ t 1 t 2 choices 2tl, the query at position 1tr = 2tr and consequently the query at position 2bl is uniquely determined, and so is the XOR-output Y of 2bl. By ¬help 4 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 3 choices for 1bl. For any of these ≤ t 1 t 2 t 3 choices 1bl, let K 1bl be the key input corresponding to position 1bl. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output equals K l 1br K r 1bl , which happens with probability at most 1 2 n −q . The total probability is at most t 1 t 2 t 3 2 n −q . Query occurs at 1bl only. By ¬help 1 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 1 choices for (1br, 2br). For any of these ≤ t 1 choices, let K 2br be the key input corresponding to position 2br. By ¬help 2 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 2 choices for 2tl. For any of these ≤ t 1 t 2 choices 2tl, the query at position 2bl is uniquely determined, and so is the XOR-output Y of 2bl. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output equals this value Y , which happens with probability at most 1 2 n −q . The total success probability is at most t 1 t 2 2 n −q . Query occurs at 1br only. By ¬help 1 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 1 choices for (1bl, 2bl). For any of these ≤ t 1 choices, let K 2bl be the key input corresponding to position 2bl. By ¬help 3 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 2 choices for 2tl. For any of these ≤ t 1 t 2 choices 2tl, the key input to the query at position 2br, say K 2br , is uniquely determined. Suppose the i-th query is a forward query y ← E(K, x) (exactly the same reasoning applies to inverse queries). If K 2br = K, the queries at positions 1br and 2br must be the same and the collision is invalid. Therefore, we assume K 2br = K. For the key K 2br , let (K 2br , x 2br , y 2br ) be any query in the query history. The i-th query makes the configuration satisfied if x 2br = x and x 2br ⊕ y 2br = x ⊕ y, or more concretely if x 2br = x and y 2br = y.
This means that, irrespectively of whether the i-th query is a forward or inverse query, the query at position 2br is uniquely determined. The i-th query is successful only if it satisfies (14) , which happens with probability at most 1 2 n −q . The total probability is at most
2 n −q . Query occurs at 1tl and 1br only. Let K be the key input for the i-th query. As the query occurs at both positions, we require K l = Z l , which fixes Z l . By ¬help 2 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 2 choices for 2br. For any of these ≤ t 2 choices 2br, we obtain a different Z. The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output equals this value Z, which happens with probability at most 1 2 n −q . The total success probability is at most t 2 2 n −q . Query occurs at 1tl and 1bl only. Let K be the key input for the i-th query. As the query occurs at both positions, we require K r = Y r , which fixes Y r . By ¬help 3 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 2 choices for 2bl. For any of these ≤ t 2 choices 2bl, we obtain a different Y . The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output equals this value Y , which happens with probability at most 1 2 n −q . The total success probability is at most t 2 2 n −q .
A.4 Proof of Lem. 5
The cases are equivalent by symmetry, and we consider col 0101 (Q q ) only. A visualization of configuration col 0101 (Q q ) can be found in Fig. 11 . For the basic proof idea, we refer to the proof of Lem. 1. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. As in Lem. 1, we assume ¬help(Q i ) and analyze the probability the i-th query makes col 0101 (Q i ) satisfied.
Without loss of generality (by symmetry), the i-th query occurs at the following positions: 1tl only, 1bl only, or (1tl, 1bl) only. We distinguish among these three cases. It may be the case that the i-th query also occurs in the right word, but this case is automatically included.
Query occurs at 1tl only. By ¬help 1 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 1 choices for (1bl, 2bl). For any of these ≤ t 1 choices, let K 1bl and K 2bl be the key inputs corresponding to positions 1bl and 2bl. By ¬help 3 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 2 choices for 2tl. For any of these ≤ t 1 t 2 choices 2tl, we obtain a different Y . The i-th query is successful only if its XOR-output equals Y K r 1bl , which happens with probability at most 1 2 n −q . The total success probability is at most t 1 t 2 2 n −q . Query occurs at 1bl only. Let K be the key input for the i-th query. By ¬help 3 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 2 choices for 1tl. For any of these ≤ t 2 choices, we obtain a different Y . By ¬help 2 (Q i ), there are ≤ t 2 choices for 2tl. For any of these ≤ t 2 2 choices 2tl, the query at position 2bl is uniquely determined, and As in this case we consider the winning query to be different from all other queries made before, we can assume a query never adds itself to a wish list. It is clear that the adversary finds a preimage for MDC-4 (in this case) only if it makes a query that is already a member of any of the wish lists. Suppose the adversary makes a query E(K, x) (either as a normal query or as a part of a super query), and suppose (K, x, y) ∈ W tl ∪ W br for some y. Then, we say that (K, x, y) is wished for, and the wish is granted if the response of the block cipher is y. Similar naming is used for inverse queries to E. Notice that the adversary may wish for multiple queries at the same time, but this does not invalidate the analysis. Additionally, each wish list element can be wished for only once. In order to find a preimage, the adversary needs at least a wish to be granted. Let (K, x, y) be an element in any of the wish lists, and suppose the adversary makes a query E(K, x) or E −1 (K, y). In case of normal queries, the answer is generated from a set of size at least 2 n−1 , and the wish is granted with probability at most 1 2 n−1 . In case the query is a part of a super query, the answer is generated from a set of size exactly 2 n−1 and the wish is also granted with probability at most 1 2 n−1 . Because each element of the wish lists can be wished for only once, the adversary finds a preimage with probability at most
It remains to bound the sizes of the wish lists afterueries. Configuration pre tl (Q q ) of Fig. 12 has ≤ t 2 solutions for each bl and br (by ¬help 3 (Q q )), and consequently ≤ t 2 solutions for tr (by ¬help 3 (Q q )). Thus |W tl | ≤ t 3 2 , and similarly we obtain |W tr | ≤ t 3 2 . Configuration pre bl (Q q ) of Fig. 12 has ≤ t 2 solutions for br (by ¬help 3 (Q q )), and consequently ≤ t 1 solutions for tl (by ¬help 1 (Q q )). For any of these ≤ t 1 t 2 choices, the query at position tr is uniquely determined (if it exists at all). Thus |W bl | ≤ t 1 t 2 , and similarly |W br | ≤ t 1 t 2 (using ¬help 2 (Q q )). Hence, in this case a preimage is found with probability at
Case 2. We make the following distinction, and consider the two sub-cases separately.
1. The contributed queries are different for both positions; 2. The contributed queries are the same for both positions.
Case 2.1. In this particular case, the winning query must be a super query. Similar to case 1, we make use of wish lists, but now for the specific case that a super query contributes two queries to a configuration. As a super query cannot contribute to (tl, tr), it can only contribute to positions (tl, br), (tr, bl), (tl, bl), (tr, br), or (bl, br). Note that if a super query contributes to positions (tl, br), the left half of the XOR-output of tl should equal the left half of the key input to br, which is the same as the key input to tl (similar for super queries contributing to (tr, bl)). Note that if a super query contributes to positions (tl, bl), the key input to bl equals the key input to tl which equals the message input to bl (similar for super queries contributing to (tr, br)). Also, note that if a super query contributes to positions (bl, br), the XOR-outputs of tl and tr must be the same. During the attack of the adversary, we maintain five initially empty wish lists W 1 , . . . , W 5 , corresponding to above cases. If a query is made by the adversary, the wish lists are updated according to the following requirements:
-If the query fits pre 1 (Q) of Of these tuples, the first element identifies the key for which the super query is made, the second and third element define the input and output of the cipher in the top row (either left or right), and the fourth and fifth element define the input and output of the cipher in the bottom row (either right or left). For W 5 , the second and third element correspond to bl and the fourth and fifth element to br. A query trivially does not add itself to the wish list (as these cases would be covered by Case 3). Suppose the adversary makes a super query to E for key K, and suppose (K, x tl , y tl , x br , y br ) ∈ W 1 for some x tl , y tl , x br , y br . This wish is then granted if the response satisfies y tl = E(K, x tl ) and y br = E(K, x br ). In order to find a preimage, the adversary needs at least a wish to be granted. As the answers are generated from a set of size exactly 2 n−1 , a wish is granted with probability at most . Because each element of the wish lists can be wished for only once, the adversary finds a preimage with probability at most |W 1 | + |W 2 | + |W 3 | + |W 4 | + |W 5 | 2 n−1 (2 n−1 − 1) .
It remains to bound the sizes of the wish lists afterueries. Configuration pre 1 (Q q ) has ≤ t 2 solutions for bl (by ¬help 3 (Q q )), and at most ≤ t 1 solutions for tr (by ¬help 1 (Q q )). Thus, |W 1 | ≤ t 1 t 2 and similarly |W 2 | ≤ t 1 t 2 . Configuration pre 3 (Q q ) has ≤ t 2 solutions for br (by ¬help 3 (Q q )), and at most ≤ t 1 solutions for tr (by ¬help 2 (Q q )). Additionally, there are 2 n/2 possibilities for W . Thus |W 3 | ≤ t 1 t 2 2 n/2 and similarly |W 4 | ≤ t 1 t 2 2 n/2 . Configuration pre 5 (Q q ) has 2 n/2 choices for W , for any of these choices it has ≤ t 1 solutions for tr (by ¬help 1 (Q q )), and consequently ≤ t 2 solutions for tl (by ¬help 3 (Q q )). Thus also |W 5 | ≤ t 1 t 2 2 n/2 . Hence, in this case a preimage is found with probability at most 16t 1 t 2 +24t 1 t 2 2 n/2 2 2n . Case 2.2. In this case, the winning query may be a normal query or a super query. The winning query can only contribute to positions (tl = br), (tr = bl), (tl = bl), or (tr = br).
We first consider the winning query to contribute to tl = br. Suppose the adversary makes a query y ← E(K, x) (either as a normal query or as a part of a super query). As it occurs at position br we require x ⊕ y = Z (because of this, the analysis for inverse queries is equivalent). Additionally, the query at position tr should have key input as well as message input equal to x. This particularly means that the key input K to tl = br must satisfy K = Z l (E(x, x) ⊕ x) r . By construction of the queries at positions bl, br, the adversary can only succeed if it ever finds an x ∈ Z n 2 that satisfies
As Y and Z are fixed, the adversary finds such x with probability at most 2 n 2 n−1 2 n−1 = 4 2 n . The same probability bound is obtained for winning queries to appear at (tr, bl).
Consider a query contributing to tl = bl. By construction, this query must be of the form E(K, K) = y where K ⊕ y = Y and K r = Y r . As Y is fixed, the adversary finds such query with probability at most 2 n/2 2 n−1 = 2·2 n/2 2 n (either in case of forward or inverse query). The same probability bound is obtained for winning queries to appear at (tr, br).
Consequently, a preimage is found in this case with probability at most
